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WHAT MAKES LOGICAL TRUTHS TRUE? 
Constantin C. BRÎNCUŞ 
ABSTRACT: The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic 
recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes 
different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as 
ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of 
meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of 
the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these 
principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are 
prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and 
should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in 
inquiry. 
KEYWORDS: empirical interpretation of logical truths, ontological 
interpretation of logical truths, semantic interpretation of logical truths, the 
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I. Introduction 
According to E. Nagel,1 there are three main interpretations of logical principles.2 
One interpretation holds that logical principles are necessary truths which are 
descriptive of the most general structure of everything both actual and possible; 
the second interpretation maintains that they contingent, although very reliable, 
empirical hypotheses, and the third interpretation takes them to be void of factual 
content and, thus, arbitrary specifications for the construction of symbolic 
systems. No doubt, these interpretations are based on some assumptions, more or 
less problematical. Very roughly, the first interpretation seems to assume that we 
have a priori knowledge about at least some facts, i.e., about at least part of the 
real structure of the world. The second interpretation assumes that all principles 
involved in inquiry are empirical generalizations, although some of them are not 
directly subject to experimental refutation. Finally, the third interpretation 
assumes that if a principle lacks factual content then it is arbitrary, even though it 
                                                                
1 Ernest Nagel, “Logic without Ontology,” in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant H. 
Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), 211.  
2 The term ‘logical principle’ is sometimes understood as referring to certain logical truths or 
logical laws. In this paper, however, I take ‘logical principle’ and ‘logical law’ to be synonymous 
with ‘logical truth.’ Although there could be made certain distinctions among these terms, for 
the purposes of this paper, I will not focus upon them.  
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has an identifiable function in inquiry. Due to the strong arguments against them, 
all these three presuppositions are, as I will argue below, if not false, at least very 
problematical. In this paper, by disentangling the lack of factual content from 
arbitrariness, I will argue for, what may be seen as, a certain version of the third 
interpretation, according to which logical principles are propositions made true by 
the meanings of certain terms – the so-called logical terms – from a definite 
linguistic framework.3 
The rationalistic assumption of the first interpretation seems very 
problematic due to the strong arguments against the existence of synthetic a priori 
knowledge about facts. Moreover, from an empiricist perspective, the validity of 
synthetic propositions is always subject to empirical tests and even if it holds in n 
cases, there is no logical guarantee that it will hold also in the n+1 case, no matter 
how large n is; it follows that no proposition which has factual content can be 
necessarily true. Hence, once the rationalist view of knowledge is forsaken, i.e., 
the idea that reason considered independently can offer knowledge about facts, as 
A. J. Ayer4 emphasized, the empiricist philosopher has to account for the logical 
principles in one of the following ways: “he must say either that they are not 
necessary, in which case he must account for the universal conviction that they 
are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and then he must explain 
how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and 
surprising.” In other words, the empiricist has to decide whether logical principles 
are about the world, and, thus, not necessary or if they are necessary, but not 
about the world. This amounts, I believe, to a decision between the second and the 
third interpretations which Nagel mentioned, with the necessary emendations. 
Regarding the structure of this paper, I will proceed as follows: I will first 
put forward certain methodological remarks with respect to the evaluation of the 
proposed interpretations. Second, in sections two and three, I will briefly present 
and critically evaluate two recent arguments for the ontological interpretation of 
logical principles (proposed by G. Sher and T. Tahko). In the forth section I will 
critically analyze three main instantiations [J. St. Mill, Quine, P. Maddy] of the 
idea that logical principles are empirical hypotheses. In the fifth section, I will 
present and argue for the idea that logical principles are true in virtue of the 
meanings of the logical terms from a certain linguistic framework, adopted for 
certain purposes of inquiry, purposes which also justify them. I will end by 
defending the proposed interpretation of two objections. 
                                                                
3 I use the expression ‘linguistic framework’ in Carnap’s sense, namely, a system of expressions 
together with the rules that govern their use (see section IV. b.).  
4 Alfred Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1936/1990), 65.  
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According to the interpretation that I put forward, logical principles are 
simply true in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms. Although their truth is 
independent of the facts from the world, they are non-arbitrary statements which 
are regulative for the use of language and deduction in inquiry. More precisely, 
logical principles specify the use of certain words and statements in inquiry. Since 
these principles also have a prescriptive function for the use of language and 
deduction in inquiry, I argue that logic – as a system of logical principles – may, 
and should, be seen as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry.  
The idea that logic is an instrument for proceeding in (scientific) inquiry, or 
a modus scientiarum, was famously held by Aristotle and many mediaeval 
philosophers (e.g. Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Petrus Hispanus). However, they 
argued that logical principles are at the same time principles of being, which, 
implicitly at least, makes them embrace the first interpretation mentioned above. 
Therefore, although the interpretation of logical principles defended in this paper 
has some features in common with the Aristotelian view, according to which logic 
is an Organon, i.e., an instrument, it should not be entirely associated with it.  
II. Methodological Remarks 
I think that it is important to briefly describe here what kind of methods, if any, 
could, and should, be used in order to evaluate the interpretations of logical 
principles mentioned above. These remarks will be useful for the particular 
analysis conducted in the sections below.  
First, if logical principles are ontological principles that govern everything 
that is or could be, how could we test such a hypothesis? Do we have epistemic 
access, in principle, to everything that is or could be? Does this supposition have 
empirical consequences which could be tested? As far as I can see, this idea could 
not be effectively disproved. Nevertheless, I do not consider that it is meaningless, 
in a wide use of the term ‘meaning,’ but simply that its presuppositions are not 
sustainable.5 On the one hand, it assumes that reality has such principles, and, on 
                                                                
5 I think that what could be done when we confront ontological interpretations of logical 
principles – and this is the method that I will follow in this paper – is to criticize their 
presuppositions, and to show that such interpretations are not necessary for understanding the 
nature of logical principles and their role in inquiry. This idea was in fact explicitly stated by 
Ernest Nagel, who emphasized that “if philosophers propose to supply a foundation for logical 
principles by reading them as formulations of immutable and necessary structures of everything 
that is or could be, I know of no method for proving them in error. I believe nevertheless, that it 
is possible to dispense with such interpretations without impairing our understanding of the 
nature and power of logic.” See Ernest Nagel, “In Defence of Logic without Metaphysics,” The 
Philosophical Review 58 (1949): 34. 
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the other hand, it assumes that we are able to know them in an a priori manner. 
Hence, generally speaking, this interpretation maintains that we have a priori 
knowledge about certain relevant facts, although it indicates no ground for this 
assertion.6 
Secondly, if logical principles are empirical generalizations, then they 
should be capable of being tested like all the other empirical hypotheses. 
However, as we will see in section IV of this paper, this criterion is not met by the 
logical principles.  
Finally, if logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings 
of the logical terms from a certain linguistic framework, we should be able to 
show that once we know the meanings of those terms, nothing else is required for 
establishing their truth. Moreover, once we have abandoned the idea that logical 
principles are grounded by the real structure of the world, which is supposed to 
guarantee their non-arbitrariness, we must explain why logical principles are non-
arbitrary even in the absence of such a powerful link with reality.  
III. Logical Principles as Ontological/Metaphysical Principles 
The idea that logical principles are necessary principles of being has a 
longstanding tradition, and was famously supported by Aristotle. The principle of 
non-contradiction, one well-known and important logical principle, which is “the 
most certain of all principles” (Metaphysics 1005b22), is asserted by Aristotle, due 
to his general conception, as being true about facts: the same attribute cannot at 
the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect. 
In the same spirit, Bertrand Russell also believed that “logic is concerned 
with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and 
general features.”7 It is very probable, however, that by this idea Russell was 
referring to the fact that abstract objects (like propositional functions), which are 
the subject matter of logic, are also part of the real world, and in this sense logic is 
also concerned with the real world.8 The Swiss mathematician Ferdinand Gonseth, 
however, gave a nice expression of the idea that logic is concerned with the real 
                                                                
6 The main problem with a view that asserts the existence of rational insights, as Boghossian 
puts it, is that “no-one has been able to explain, clearly enough, in what an act of rational 
insight could intelligibly consist.” See Paul Boghossian, “Blind Reasoning,” Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary  77 (2003): 230-231.  
7 Bertarnd Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
Ltd., 1920, 2nd edition), 169.  
8 See Penelope Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (2012): 
497.  
What Makes Logical Truths True? 
253 
world, by saying that “logic is the physics of the arbitrary object,”9 expression 
which also emphasizes the topic-neutral character of logic. Of course, whether we 
may have knowledge of such objects is a very problematical issue. 
Even today, the idea that logical principles are primarily ontological 
principles is endorsed by some philosophers. For instance, T. Tahko expresses the 
principle of non-contradiction in a very similar manner as Aristotle did: the same 
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the 
same respect and in the same domain.10 In what follows I will briefly present and 
critically analyse two recent arguments, proposed by T. Tahko and G. Sher, for the 
idea that logical principles describe, or have a strong connection with, 
ontological/metaphysical structures.  
a) T. Tahko’s Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Principles 
Tahko’s general idea is that logic is grounded in metaphysics, logical principles 
being supposed to express the most general structure of reality. Specifically, “a 
sentence is logically true if and only if it is true in every genuinely possible 
configuration of the world.”11 Thus, logical necessities might be explained as those 
propositions true in virtue of the nature of every situation, or every object and 
property. In addition, as he emphasizes, since only metaphysical modality could 
secure the correspondence between a possible world and the structure of reality, 
genuine possibility should be understood in terms of metaphysical possibility, 
preserving thus the idea that logic is the most general science. Metaphysics “is 
about mapping the fundamental structure of reality” and logic “is about 
representing the results formally.”12 Of course, since it is not necessary to formally 
represent the results of metaphysics, an immediate consequence of the latter idea 
is that logic would not be necessary for metaphysics, a view which is very 
implausible. 
The metaphysical account for logical principles proposed by Tahko seems 
very problematic to me. In what way metaphysics maps “the fundamental 
structure of reality,” and how exactly do we get to know, if it is possible, this 
fundamental structure of reality? If we suppose that this structure is to be known a 
                                                                
9 Ferdinand Gonseth, Qu’est-ce que la logique? (Paris: Hermann, 1937).  
10 Tuomas E. Tahko, “The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth,” in The Metaphysics of 
Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things in Between, ed. Penelope Rush 
(CUP, 2014), 239. 
11 Tahko, “The Metaphysical Interpretation,” 239. 
12Tuomas E. Tahko, “The Metaphysical Status of Logic,” in The Logica Yearbook 2007, ed. 
Michal Peliš (Praha, Filosofia, 2008), 8.  
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posteriori, then we have no ground to say that it is the fundamental structure of 
reality, because experience offers us just contingent facts.13 If we suppose that this 
structure is to be known a priori, as the metaphysicians usually believed, we come 
back to rationalism, but, as we mentioned above, also in this case we have no 
ground to assert that we have a priori knowledge about certain real facts.  
In addition, as Nagel14 similarly pointed out, when we say that logical 
principles are true in all genuinely possible configurations of the world (GPW), 
what do we mean by a ‘genuinely possible configuration of the world?’ If we 
identify a GPW on the basis of logical principles, namely, a GPW is a 
configuration of the world which conforms to logical principles, and there is no 
other way to identify a GPW, then we simply have a nominal, trivial definition. 
Namely, a GPW is a possible world which conforms to logical principles and thus 
they hold in each GPW. This definition simply gives the meaning of the 
expression ‘GPW,’ and there is no way in which such a definition may by refuted 
by any possible observations. However, in this case the definition of logical truths 
becomes circular, because the expression ‘logical truth’ also occurs in the 
definiens, namely: a sentence is a logical truth if and only if it is true in every 
world which conforms to logical truths. Of course, if a GPW is identified by 
metaphysical criteria, then we have the difficulties mentioned above.  
Moreover, in the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction 
mentioned above, a very important role is played by the expressions ‘same 
attribute’ and ‘same respect.’ These specifications seem to be meant to save the 
principle for all counterexamples and, thus, make us unable to construct a genuine 
empirical test. The main idea is that the principle is employed as a criterion for 
specifying ‘the same attribute’ and ‘the same respect.’ Thus, the principle has a 
self-protective formulation. For example, if we take a coin and say that it is 
circular and also not-circular, it will be objected that not in the same respect (once 
viewed perpendicular to its faces, and then from the middle, parallel to its faces). 
If we specify the same respect as being the face of the coin viewed 
perpendicularly, the coin will delimit an angle of thirty degrees and also one of 
sixty degrees. In this case, the defender of the principle will say: yes, but not in 
the same respect; it is not viewed at the same distance from the face of the coin. In 
order to save the principle, what has been previously established as the same 
respect is now modified, i.e., the conditions in which we evaluate the previously 
                                                                
13 This is in fact one of the main ideas of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, i.e., the view that we may 
have knowledge, in the precise sense of this term, only about contingent facts, and was also 
famously stated by David Hume. See also Ayer’s reasoning from the Introduction section above. 
14 Nagel, “Logic without Ontology,” 214-217. 
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established same attribute are now modified, and the principle of non-
contradictions functions as a criterion for specifying the new ‘the same respect.’ 
We do not have a specification of ‘the same respect’ antecedent to the application 
of this principle. Thus, because of the way in which ‘the same respect’ is used, we 
cannot properly test the principle. More generally, since the expression ‘the same 
respect’ seems to belong to the epistemological lexicon and it is introduced in an 
ontological definition of the principle, the validity of this interpretation raises 
serious doubts. 
Furthermore, if we consider the diameter of the coin and say that it has 2 
centimeters, and then that it has 3 centimeters, it will be argued that it is not 
possible. But the impossibility does not come from empirical tests. The 
impossibility for the same diameter to have two dimensions, in the same time, 
derives from the fact that we use the expressions ‘2 centimeters’ and ‘3 
centimeters’ to formulate different outcomes of measurement. No diameter will 
have two dimensions in the same time because the expressions are used in such a 
way that one of the attribute of dimension is used to specify the absence of the 
other. Hence, the underlying idea is that the ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ of 
attributes are specified in terms of the conformity of attributes to the principle of 
non-contradiction. We have to apply the principle in specifying ‘the same 
attribute’ before deciding whether a certain controversial instance obeys or nor 
the principle of non-contradiction. This suggests that the principle of non-
contradiction works as an instrument of specifying the use of expressions in a 
language, as a regulative principle for operating distinctions, rather than being an 
ontological principle.15 
Finally, it worth mentioning that even the etymology of the word ‘contra-
diction’ comes against an ontological explanation of the principle of non-
contradiction. The Latin word ‘contradictio’ derives from ‘contradico’ which 
means ‘speak against.’ Thus, only a dictum can come against another dictum, but 
not an object, a fact or an event. In the spirit of this line of thought, David Hilbert 
emphasized in his lecture “On the Infinite” that to think that facts could 
contradict one another is simply ‘careless thinking’: 
As some people see ghosts, another writer seems to see contradictions even 
where no statements whatsoever have been made, viz., in the concrete world of 
sensation, the ‘consistent functioning’ of which he takes as special assumption. I 
myself have always supposed that only statements, and hypothesis insofar as they 
lead through deduction to statements, could contradict one another. The view 
                                                                
15 For a similar discussion see also Nagel, “Logic without Ontology,” 212-214, and Nagel, “In 
Defence of Logic,” 29-30.  
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that facts and events could themselves be in contradiction seems to me to be a 
prime example of careless thinking.16 
Of course, a fellow of the ontological approach to the logical principles will 
easily accept that objects and events cannot, as a matter of fact, contradict one 
another, and this is precisely because the law of non-contradiction does not allow 
them. What Hilbert says, however, is more than that: he says that the facts or 
events could not contradict one another because the notion of contradiction 
cannot be meaningfully applied in the world of facts. That is to say that it makes 
no sense to assert that facts could or could not contradict one another. To apply 
the notion of contradiction in the domain of facts is simply a categorical error, an 
example of ‘careless thinking.’  
b) Gila Sher’s Invariantist Interpretation 
According to Gila Sher17 logic “is grounded both in the mind and in the world, and 
its two grounds are interconnected.” What Sher precisely understands by ‘world’ 
is not so clear, but, nevertheless, she clearly specifies that the terms ‘world’ and 
‘reality’ (taken as synonyms) are not used to denote ‘thing in itself,’ ‘mere 
appearances,’ neither just empirical experience, not conceptual reality. In spite of 
these negative determinations, however, “logic is both in the mind and in the 
world in a substantive sense, a sense that yields significant explanations, solves 
significant problems, and has significant consequences.”18 Although this account is 
not a purely ontological one, the main features of this interpretation, as we will 
see below, endorse I believe the idea that Sher’s account of logic is strongly related 
to an ontological interpretation of logical principles. 
The main argument for this view regards the intimate relation between 
logic and reality via truth. The relation of logical consequence establishes between 
a set of sentences Γ and a sentence S if and only if the truth of Γ is transmitted to S, 
or guarantees the truth of S. However, since truth “inherently depends on 
whether things in the world are as given sentences say they are,”19 then the notion 
of logical consequence also depends on the facts of the world. Specifically, in 
nontrivial cases, S is a logical consequence of Γ if the facts described by Γ strongly 
                                                                
16 David Hilbert, “On the Infinite,” translated by Erna Putnam and Gerald J. Massey from 
Mathematische Annalen, vol. 95, (Berlin, 1926), in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected 
Readings, 2nd edition, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, (Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 185.  
17 Gila Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?” Synthese 181 (2011): 354. 
18 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 354. 
19 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 356.  
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necessitate the facts described by S. More precisely, the main idea is that the 
relation of logical consequence is grounded by a formal strong necessitation 
relation present in reality, which establishes between states of affaires. This 
relation is a formal mathematical relation that governs “the formal (structural) 
features of objects, or their formal behaviour.”20 The notion of formality is defined 
in mathematical terms, by generalizing Tarski’s criterion of logicality, namely, “to 
be formal is to be invariant under the isomorphisms of structures.”21 
Among the three relations just described (i.e., logical consequence, 
guarantee, and strong necessitation), there exist downward and upward 
dependencies, which are meant to ground the relation of logical consequence in 
reality. The downward dependency indicates that if the relation of strong 
necessitation does not obtain between the relevant states of affairs then neither 
the relation of guarantee, nor the relation of logical consequence, obtains. The 
upward dependency indicates that if certain premises logically imply a certain 
conclusion then the relation of strong necessitation obtains between the relevant 
states of affairs, namely, those described by the premises and conclusion. We may 
represent all these relations – as Sher22 does – by different kind of arrows in the 
following diagram: 
 (Level of Logic)            Γ ╞S σ 
 
(Level of Truth)   T(Γ) →→→T(σ)  
 
 (Level of Reality)  SΓ Sσ 
Although Sher’s interpretation of logical consequence is very interesting, 
because it goes beyond the limits of possible experience,23 it is open to criticism. 
                                                                
20 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 361-362.  
21 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 363. See also Alfred Tarski, “What are Logical Notions?” History 
and Philosophy of Logic 7, 2 (1986): 143-154.  
22 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 362.  
23 It is beyond the limits of possible experience because there are an infinite number of instances 
of logical implication, and we cannot verify whether all of them are grounded in something 
present in reality; we also lack a proof which shows that in principle they could be grounded in 
reality). In addition, we have no reason to assert that we have access to the real structure of 
reality, be it mathematical or not.  
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First, as Rossberg24 indicates, there is no requirement to find actual situations in 
the world in order to show that the premises of an argument are true while the 
conclusion is false; any counter-model will do this job. Thus, a failure of the 
relation of strong necessitation seems unnecessary for grounding the failure of 
logical consequence. In addition, since classical logic is grounded in the worldly 
strong necessitation relations formulated by classical mathematics, and “in the case 
of nonclassical logic, the formal laws are given by nonclassical mathematics,”25 we 
may wonder, as Rossberg26 does, how is it possible that classical mathematics 
allows us to ground classical logic in reality, and intuitionist mathematics allows 
us to ground intuitionist logic in reality, and, yet, they disagree? For this may 
suggest that, after all, logic is not grounded in reality, but in the (mathematical) 
representation of reality. As a matter of fact, it would be a more modest 
assumption to suppose that mathematics “imposes structure on reality” rather than 
discovering the structure of reality, in which case “we have considerable freedom 
in the choice of structures that we want to give the world.”27 
In fact, even if we assume Sher’s definition of formality, in order to fulfil its 
task, we must make explicit a necessary requirement for the mathematical theory 
which is meant to represent the structure of reality, namely, that it has to be 
categorical.28 Thus, logical consequence could be grounded only in worldly formal 
relations represented by categorical mathematical theories. Moreover, of course, 
the proposed interpretation of the ground of logic assumes that we could know the 
real structure of reality. Still, since we are supposed to know this structure via 
mathematics, which is generally believed to be an a priori inquiry, then it also 
assumes an a priori knowledge about facts, i.e., about at least part of the real 
structure of the world. Furthermore, as a final remark, I think that Sher’s 
interpretation only seems plausible because, as her particular examples illustrate,29 
it uses a set-theoretic interpretation of logical operators. Of course, this would not 
entail that logic is grounded in reality, but merely that we may interpret logical 
operators in set-theoretic terms. 
                                                                
24 Marcus Rossberg, “Comment on Gila Sher’s ‘Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?’” Pacific 
APA, Vancouver, April 8-12 (2009): 3. Online version: http://homepages.uconn.edu/ 
~mar08022/papers/Rossberg_on_Sher.pdf 
25 Sher, “Is Logic in the Mind,” 364. 
26 Rossberg, “Comment,” 9. 
27 Rossberg, “Comment,” 9. The existence of different geometries may illustrate better this point 
with respect to the structure of space. 
28 It is well known that not all mathematical theories meet this criterion. 
29 For instance, the existential quantifier is interpreted as non-emptiness, conjunction as 
intersection, and so on.  
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To sum up, the idea that logical principles describe the most general 
structure of reality, or that they are grounded in such a structure, does not seem to 
be sustainable. First, since logical principles are taken in general to be known a 
priori, i.e., their truth is independent of observations, and also to describe at least 
some facts, i.e., real structures, the present interpretation assumes an a priori 
knowledge about facts. However, as we repeatedly emphasized, there is no 
reasonable ground for asserting this idea; we do not have knowledge of 
undetermined objects, of objects as such. Second, it seems to transform the 
function of logical principles for introducing distinctions and instituting adequate 
linguistic usage, into ontological constraints. Although it seems very plausible to 
interpret some logical principles in an ontological manner (at least for the level of 
the world accessible to our experience), we have no reasonable ground to 
maintain this. Therefore, this interpretation does not seem feasible; a better 
candidate that has less problematical assumptions would be preferable. 
IV. Logical Principles as Empirical Generalizations 
In this section I will critically analyze three main instantiations (Mill, Quine, 
Maddy) of the idea that logical principles are empirical hypotheses, and, thus not 
necessary. Maddy’s interpretation, as we will see, although is an empirical one, 
takes them to be necessary only relative to the presence of the corresponding 
structure of the world – a view which needs some ontological underpinnings.  
a) J. St. Mill’s View 
One of the pioneers who endorsed the idea that logical principles are not 
necessary propositions was J. St. Mill. For him, they are a posteriori and thus 
unnecessary. Mill believed that logical principles are inductive generalizations30 
confirmed in an extremely large number of cases. This large number of instances 
makes us to believe that logical principles are necessarily and universally true and 
                                                                
30 Mill believed that principles such as the principle of non-contradiction, or of excluded 
middle, are real propositions, i.e., they convey new information, and not merely verbal, i.e., 
“which assert of a thing under a particular name only what is asserted of it in the fact of calling 
it by that name.” John St. Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a 
Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1886), 74/ Book I, Chap. VI. Being real, however, these 
propositions are, as for Quine, a posteriori. The ground for Mill’s distinction between real and 
verbal propositions is to be found in his (semantic) theory of denotation and connotation (see 
John Skorupski, “Mill on Language and Logic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John 
Skorupski (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36-40.)  
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that, although is possible, a negative instance will never appear. According to this 
view, the method for testing the validity of logical principles is the same as for the 
other empirical hypotheses, specifically, if an argument gives a materially true 
conclusion from materially true premises then it is valid, if not, it is invalid.31 
Consequently, in order to establish the validity of an argument we need empirical 
evidence.  
We may agree, however, that logical principles could be discovered and 
learned inductively, but this does not entail that they are known, or could only be 
known, empirically. As we will argue below, logical principles may be known 
independently of experience. By this I mean, following Ayer,32 that their validity 
is not determined in the same way as for the empirical hypotheses. For instance, 
let us consider an argument from whose premises ‘A’ and “if A then B,” asserted as 
true, is drawn – according to the rule modus ponens33 – the conclusion ‘B,’ which, 
as a matter of fact, is false.34 If we follow the proposed method, then we will have 
to reject modus ponens as a universally valid rule. But it seems that in such a case, 
as long as the normal meanings of the logical terms are preserved, we are more 
inclined to say that the premises were asserted mistakenly or that the recognition 
that ‘B’ is false was an error. There is no doubt that the proposition “If A and (if A 
then B), then B” is true as long as the terms ‘and’ and ‘if… then’ have the 
meanings as given by the normal truth tables.35 
Moreover, we know that the validity of many hypotheses employed in 
science can only be established by examining the consequences implied by them 
in accordance with logical principles. Nevertheless, in a non-holistic context, 
                                                                
31 This particular method seems to be implicitly present also in Sher’s account, because she 
believes that if a certain relation does not establish between the states of affairs represented by 
the sentences of an argument, then the argument is invalid, i.e., the relation of logical 
consequence does not establish either. In Sher’s terms, a failure of strong necessitation relation 
entails the failure of the corresponding relation of logical consequence.  
32 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 68.  
33 Mill had in mind the Aristotelian logic, but his considerations may be applied also to modern 
logic. 
34 Such interpretations, supposed to be counterexamples to modus ponens, were in fact proposed 
by Vann McGee, “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens,” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 
462-471 and Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, “Ifs and Oughts,” Journal of Philosophy 
107(2010): 115-143, and they have generated ample discussions among logicians and 
philosophers. 
35 See also Nagel, “Logic without Ontology,” 219 and Constantin C. Brîncuş and Iulian D. 
Toader, “A Carnapian Approach to Counterexamples to Modus Ponens,” Romanian Journal of 
Analytic Philosophy VII (2013): 78-85. 
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when the consequences derived from premises believed to be true are in 
disagreement with the observations of experience, it is typically not the logical 
principles used to drawn the consequences which are rejected. If they where, then 
the relation of logical consequence would be an empirical one, and it would be 
difficult to speak about the confirmation or confutation of hypothesis by empirical 
data. It follows that the proposed method for testing the logical principles is not a 
feasible one. As long as we accept that we can test certain domains of science 
singularly, i.e., we disprove the holistic view, we should accept the idea that the 
ground for the revision of logical principles must lie elsewhere than in the subject 
matter of the natural sciences – in the sense that observations could not directly 
refute a logical principle. In the next section I will argue that the situation is the 
same even in a holistic context.  
b) Quine’s Naturalist36 Approach 
A more sophisticated form of empiricism was elaborated by W.V.O. Quine, who 
embraces the first option that the empiricist, according to Ayer, has available, 
namely, logical principles are about the world, and, thus, non-necessary. 
According to Quine, since “logic, as any science, has as its business the pursuit of 
truth”37 and “there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable 
hypotheses,”38 it follows that logic, as the entire human knowledge, has the same 
status, namely, it is a posteriori. Logical principles are themselves a constituent 
part of the entire system of science, and, consequently, they also confront, 
although indirectly, the experience tribunal. Indirectly because, according to 
Quine, what we actually test are not isolated propositions, or particular sets of 
propositions, but the entire system of science. In the case of a conflict with 
experience we may revise, in accordance with the principles of conservatism and 
simplicity, whatever proposition from the system.39 
                                                                
36 Quine’s conception on the nature of logical principles does not necessarily follow from his 
holistic view – Carnap himself adopts the epistemological holism, but mainly from his attack of 
the first ‘dogma’ of empiricism, which leads finally to the naturalistic representation of 
knowledge, i.e., to the idea that all our knowledge is a posteriori. Epistemological holism and 
revisability of any statement are perfectly compatible with the existence of a clear and precise 
distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge (see Michael Friedman, “Philosophical 
Naturalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association  71(1997): 9-
10.)  
37 W.V.O. Quine, Methods of Logic (revised edition) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1950/1966), xi.  
38 W.V.O. Quine, “Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means,” Dialectica 49 (1995): 251.  
39 See W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review  60 (1951): 20-43. 
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It is important to emphasize, however, that Quine does not endorse the idea 
that we establish the validity of logical principles by confronting them with 
observational data, in order to see if materially true premises entail a materially 
true conclusion. The revision of a logical principle is made as a pragmatic decision 
for readjusting the entire system of science to observational data. Logical 
principles can be revised, “but this is not to deny that such laws are true in virtue 
of the conceptual scheme, or by virtue of meanings,” and “because these laws are 
so central, any revision of them is felt to be the adoption of a new conceptual 
scheme, the imposition of new meanings on old words.”40 This amounts, I believe, 
to saying that logical principles are true in virtue of the meanings of the logical 
terms, and to the recognition of the fact that the meanings of such terms could be 
changed.41 
However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between the 
revisions of truth-values of empirical statements, whose meanings are preserved, 
and the revision of the truth-values of statements by changing their meanings it is 
an important difference. In my understanding, this entails the idea that there is a 
distinction between propositions true in virtue of meanings, and propositions true 
in virtue of facts, i.e., between analytic and synthetic propositions, even if such a 
distinction may admit borderline cases with respect to the entire system of 
science. In spite of this, the fact that logical principles are revisable does not entail 
that they are not necessary and, consequently, empirical generalizations. As we 
will see below, although they could be revised, logical principles are true 
independent of facts, and thus necessary, in a certain linguistic framework. 
In some writings,42 Quine seems to rule out any kind of distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions, suggesting that all sentences have, in a certain 
degree, empirical content, i.e., they all are synthetic. For instance, he believes that 
the validity of mathematics is established by confronting it with the observational 
data. This happens because when we test an empirical hypothesis we take it often 
in conjunction with propositions from pure mathematics. In this way pure 
mathematics becomes applied. If the theory is corroborated by experiments, then 
mathematical propositions are believed to be true, if not they are refuted. 
                                                                
40 Quine, Methods of Logic, xiv. 
41 In Philosophy of Logic, (Harvard University Press, 1994), 81-82, Quine emphasizes that 
logical terms change their meanings in different logics. A change of logic amounts, thus, to a 
change of subject, i.e., a change of the meanings of the logical terms. In this respect, Quine is in 
agreement with M. Dummett who also considers that when two different logical schools 
disagree, they understand some logical terms in different ways. See Michael A. E. Dummett, The 
Logical Basis of Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 1991), 302.  
42 Quine, “Naturalism,” 251- 261. 
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However, as M. Friedman emphasized, the fundamental problem with this 
representation is that a physical theory, viz. the theory of relativity, is not happily 
viewed as a large conjunction formed from Einstein field equations, the Kleinian 
theory of transformation groups, and the Riemannian theory of manifolds, in 
which case Eddington’s experimental results “are potentially spreading empirical 
confirmation over the entire conjunction.”43 In such cases the mathematical 
conjunct works rather “as a necessary presupposition of that theory, as a means of 
representation or a language, as it were, without which the theory could not even 
be formulated or envisioned as a possibility in the first place.”44 This amounts, in 
my understanding, to recognize the fact that there is a distinction between 
propositions from empirical science, i.e., synthetic, and analytic propositions 
which work as instruments in the system of science, and whose truth is not a 
problem of matter of facts, but of meanings.45 
We can, and should, admit that logical principles are revisable, but, 
following Carnap, who otherwise agrees with many of Quine’s ideas,46 we should 
recognize a distinction between the revision of the truth-values of certain 
propositions on empirical grounds, without abrogating their meanings, and the 
                                                                
43 Friedman, “Philosophical Naturalism,”12. 
44 Friedman, “Philosophical Naturalism,”12. 
45 Friedman’s reply also answers Alonzo Church’s objection to Nagel’s idea that logical principles 
are not tested in the same manner as the empirical hypotheses (see Alonzo Church, “Review: 
Ernest Nagel, ‘Logic without Ontology’,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 10 (1945): 17. Logical 
principles, and probably the mathematical ones, are not conjuncts in the entire system of 
science which confronts the experience tribunal, but rather they are regulative principles which 
also serve as conditions for formulating certain empirical hypotheses. The relation between 
logico-mathematical statements and the other statements is not that of conjunction but rather of 
presupposing, which is a very different relation. As N. Rescher puts it, “p presupposes q means ‘q 
is a necessary condition for the very possibility (or even meaningfulness) of p’”. Formally: (◊p → 
q). See Nicholas Rescher, “On the Logic of Presupposition,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 21 (1961): 527.  
46 “Quine shows that a scientist, who discovers a conflict between his observations and his 
theory and who is therefore compelled to make a readjustment somewhere in the total system of 
science, has much latitude with respect to the place where a change is to be made. In this 
procedure, no statement is immune to revision, not even the statements of logic and of 
mathematics. There are only practical differences, and these are differences in degree, inasmuch 
as a scientist is usually less willing to abandon a previously accepted general empirical law than 
a single observation sentence, and still less willing to abandon a law of logic or of mathematics. 
With all this I am entirely in agreement.” Rudolf Carnap, “W. V. Quine on Logical Truth,” in 
The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. XI, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul Arthur 
Schilpp, (Open Court Publishing Company, 1963/1997), 921.  
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revision of the truth-values of certain propositions by changing their meanings. I 
think that Carnap’s remarks47 are helpful for understanding this distinction:  
I should make a distinction between two kinds of readjustment in the case 
of a conflict with experience, namely, between a change in the language, and a 
mere change in or addition of, a truth-value ascribed to an indeterminate 
statement, (i.e., a statement whose truth value it not fixed by the rules of language, 
say by the postulates of logic, mathematics, and physics). A change of the first 
kind constitutes a radical alteration, sometimes a revolution, and it occurs only at 
certain historically decisive points in the development of science. On the other 
hand, changes of the second kind occur every minute. A change of the first kind 
constitutes, strictly speaking, a transition from a language Ln to a new language 
Ln+1. My concept of analyticity as an explicandum has nothing to do with such a 
transition. It refers in each case to just one language; ‘analytic in Ln’ and ‘analytic 
in Ln+1’ are two different concepts. That a certain sentence S is analytic in Ln means 
only something about the status of S within the language Ln; as has often been 
said, it means that the truth of S in Ln is based on the meanings in Ln of the terms 
occurring in S.  
Whenever a change of the first kind occurs, such change is made as a 
pragmatic decision for readjusting the entire system of beliefs for certain purposes 
of inquiry. The decision of changing a linguistic framework, i.e., a system of 
expressions together with rules that govern their use, is not in itself a cognitive 
matter, although it may, nevertheless, be influenced by theoretical knowledge.48 
Therefore, logical principles, analytic49 principles in a certain language, are true in 
virtue of the meanings of the logical terms from that language, and can be revised 
once we make the pragmatic decision to change it (see section V for the idea that 
logical principles are ‘framework principles’).  
 
 
                                                                
47 Carnap, “W.V. Quine on Logical Truth,” 921.  
48 See Rudolf Carnap, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 4(1950): 20-40. 
49 There is a distinction between statements true in virtue of the logical terms (logical truths) 
and statements true in virtue of logical and non-logical terms (analytic statements per se). 
However, if we define the analytic statements as statements true in virtue of meanings, then, in 
this sense, logical truths are also analytic. In this context of the discussion, the distinction is not 
so relevant. 
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c) Maddy’s Second Philosophy Account 
Another interesting view of logical principles was recently proposed by Penelope 
Maddy,50 who develops an empirical interpretation starting from the Kantian 
combination between transcendental Idealism and empirical Realism. According 
to Kant, logical structure, viewed transcendentally, is imposed on the world by 
our discursive modes of thought, and, viewed empirically, the world simply 
displays those structures as a matter of objective fact. Maddy tries to preserve 
these two features in a naturalized framework, by arguing, for the empirical side 
first, that the macro-world simply displays a certain structure, a Kant-Frege (KF) 
structure (given by the Kantian forms of judgement and updated with the Fregean 
results, and formed from objects, properties, relations, dependencies), and then 
arguing, for the naturalized transcendental side, that our cognitive mechanisms 
have evolved in such way that are able to detect this KF structure. The logic 
which represents, or is true of, this KF structure, however, is not identical with 
the entire classical logic, because ‘the physical structure of the world’ does not 
validate all principles of classical logic. The law of excluded middle and the 
material conditional “appear as idealizations introduced into that logic for good 
reasons.”51 
In sum, Maddy’s idealized inquirer, the Second Philosopher, believes that 
the macro-world really has a KF structure, and that our cognitive mechanisms 
detect this structure because we live in a KF world and interact with it. These 
ideas are sustained by a large number of recent psychological studies, i.e., 
experimental studies, which are meant to support the idea that we are able we 
detect objects, properties and relations because they are really there, in the world. 
In the sketched picture, “logical truths are true because the world is made up of 
objects enjoying various interrelations with dependencies between them, and we 
tend to believe some of the simpler of these truths because human cognition has 
been turned by evolution to detect these very features.”52 Nevertheless, since the 
structure observed in our experience seems not to be present, for example, at the 
(quantum) micro-world, then we must admit that “logic applies to a situation 
insofar as it does have those features, and our cognitive machinery has evolved to 
detect those features.” Therefore, the updated definition becomes: “logical laws are 
                                                                
50 Penelope Maddy, Second Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2007); Penelope Maddy, “The 
Philosophy of Logic,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18, (2012): 481-504.  
51 Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” 500.  
52 Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” 501. 
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true in any situation with the right physical structuring; their truth is contingent 
on the presence of that structuring.”53 Moreover, Maddy emphasizes that  
we tend to believe the laws of logic independently of any experience because of 
our hard-wiring, we know them in a sense a priori, and we tend to think of them 
as necessary, that is, we tend to built them into our very idea of a possible world 
– and all this happens despite the fact that they wouldn’t be true if the world 
were different and in fact don’t seem to hold in the actual micro-world.54 
Although I find this proposal very interesting, I am very sceptic regarding 
its validity. Even if we may agree that we usually observe a so-called KF structure 
in the world that we live in, this does not necessarily entail that the (macro-) 
world really has this structure, i.e., that the KF structure is the real structure of 
the macro-world. I think that the psychological observations do not offer us a 
sufficient ground for inferring that the structure we observe is the real structure of 
the macro-world, i.e., of a certain level of the world. Since psychological studies 
are based on observations, that are always made in a ‘horizon of expectations’55 
which, in turn, reflects the manner human beings approach the world, it follows 
that observations do not represent pure facts of the world, or its fundamental 
structure. They are always relative to the human point of view. Thus, although it 
starts as an empirical interpretation of logical principles, this account is 
transformed in a relativized ontological interpretation. ‘Relativized’ in the sense 
that considers the world to have certain different structures at different levels and, 
due to the fact that we live in a certain domain/at a certain level of the world, we 
have access to the very structure of (this level of) the world.  
To sum up, the interpretation of logical principles as empirical hypotheses, 
which are true in virtue of empirical facts, is not feasible. Mill’s vision seems 
untenable because it disregards certain logical facts, i.e., the way in which 
logicians test validity of logical propositions, and the way in which the method of 
science actually works, namely, it presupposes the validity of logical principles, in 
deriving consequences from general hypotheses, and is not aiming at validating 
them. Quine’s vision is not essentially problematic because it is holistic, Carnap 
also accepts the epistemological holism, but because it seems to disregard the 
distinction between propositions true in virtue of meanings and propositions true 
in virtue of facts, and, consequently, the kinds of changes that may occur in the 
entire system of science. The recognition of this distinction means, implicitly, that 
                                                                
53 Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” 502. 
54 Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” 502. 
55 See Karl R. Popper, “The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of Knowledge,” in Karl R. 
Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (OUP, 1979).  
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logical principles are true in virtue of the meanings of logical terms from a certain 
linguistic framework. This point will be elaborated in section five. Finally, 
Maddy’s interpretation56 seems to me to be closely related to an ontological one, 
by presupposing that we come to know the real structure of the world, and by 
implicitly assuming that these structures are reflected in an invariant way by 
language. 
V. Logical Principles as Regulative Principles of Inquiry57 
In general, natural language, as it is, is sufficient for the purposes of efficient 
communication in daily activities. However, in certain domains of inquiry, 
especially in science, a greater precision is necessary for the use of language than 
the one found in natural language. For instance, to take a trivial example, a certain 
term must express the same meaning in the context of an argument, and this is 
precisely what the principle of identity – in one of its formulations – requires. In 
the same manner, the principle of non-contradiction requires that a certain term 
should not be applied and denied to the same object in the context of an 
argument. People do not always follow the rule modus ponens in their ordinary 
reasoning, but this desideratum of logic must be followed in science. In this sense, 
logical principles have a prescriptive function for the use of language. They do not 
describe the actual way in which agents think and use language.58 They indicate 
the direction in which precision may be obtained, and, therefore, they fix an ideal 
that may, and should, be achieved in order to fulfil certain objectives of inquiry.  
Let us consider for instance the various modern systems of logic. Their main 
aim is not to represent the ‘true nature,’ if any, of an antecedently identifiable 
relation of ‘implication;’ they are built as alternative specifications for a precise use 
of this term and for the performance of inferences.59 Without explicit logical 
                                                                
56 An interpretation that takes logical principles as a product of evolution, without assuming that 
they have, or are grounded by, a corresponding structure, would be less problematical. They 
could be seen is as instruments adopted in the course of evolution for their adaptability 
function, which also justifies them. 
57 This section develops, and is mainly based on, Rudolf Carnap and Ernest Nagel’s 
interpretations of logical principles and on the interpretation developed by (other) logical 
positivists (viz. A.J. Ayer, H. Hahn et al.).  
58 The psychologistic conception, which states that logical truths are empirical statements which 
describe the ways in which people actually think, has been in a continuous obliteration after 
Gottlob Frege’s well-known criticisms, according to which logic is concerned with the ways in 
which people must think, if they are not to miss the truth.  
59 As a matter of fact, Quine himself regards the theory of deduction (for propositional logic) as 
“a formal systematization of certain aspects of the ordinary use of language and exercise of 
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principles it is almost impossible to evaluate the validity of the performed 
inferences. Once the meanings of certain terms – the so-called logical terms – are 
precisely fixed, inferences can be performed and evaluated in a precise manner. 
Moreover, the fact that the meanings of logical terms from a system of logic do not 
correspond to the meanings of their counter-parts from natural language show us 
why logical principles also serve as “proposals for modifying old usages and 
instituting new ones”60 and, thus, their regulative function is again revealed. Their 
main aim is to direct the use of language in the direction of clarity and precision. 
The idea that logical principles are true in virtue of the meanings of the 
logical terms, we may say, is obvious from the practice of logic. In order to see that 
a statement is a logical truth, we do not make appeal to any facts, we simply apply 
the semantic and syntactic methods which are essentially based on the meanings 
of the logical terms – no matter how we may take these meanings to be defined, 
via model-theory or via proof-theory (as the inferentialists do). It is important to 
emphasize the difference between the idea that logical truths are based on 
linguistic conventions,61 and the idea that they are true based on meanings. Rudolf 
Carnap himself disapproved the expression “linguistic conventions” as applying to 
his explanation of logical truths. The choice of the meanings of the logical terms 
may be a matter of convention, but once these meanings are fixed, there is not 
conventional at all which statements are logically true: “once the meanings of the 
individual words in a sentence… are given (which may be regarded as a matter of 
convention), then it is no longer a matter of convention or of arbitrary choice 
whether or not to regard the sentence as true; the truth of such sentence is 
determined by the logical relations holding between given meanings.”62 
Logical principles are also necessary relative to the meanings we attribute to 
the logical terms. If we change those meanings, then we must hold a different 
                                                                                                                                       
reason.” See W.V.O. Quine, “Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus,” Mind, New 
Series 43 (1934): 473. 
60 Nagel, “Logic without Ontology,” 227. 
61 I do not endorse the idea, as Nagel, in “Logic without Ontology,” does, that logical truths are 
linguistic conventions or consequences of such conventions, given, probably, by implicit 
definitions. In this way, Quine’s famous criticism for the “linguistic theory of logical truth,” a 
label given by Quine, may be putted aside. In fact, as I mentioned, Carnap found this description 
inappropriate for his explanation of logical truth. Azzouni’s recent article on logical 
conventionalism offers a good analysis of Quine’s criticism of logical conventionalism. See Jody 
Azzouni, “A Defense of Logical Conventionalism,” in The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical 
Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things in Between, ed. Penelope Rush (CUP, 2014). 
62 Carnap, “W. V. Quine on Logical Truth,” 915-916.  
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class of logical principles. Of course, there is nothing necessary in maintaining a 
certain class of meanings for certain words. The fact that a certain choice of 
meanings was fruitful in the past does not guarantee that it will be fruitful in the 
future. Nevertheless, the truth of certain logical principles, once certain meanings 
for logical terms were established, is different from the acceptance of those 
meanings in future. The acceptance of those meanings is a pragmatic decision 
which, once accepted, entails a certain class of logical principles.  
The idea that logical truths are true in virtue of meanings, i.e., analytic, 
necessary and prescriptive is fruitfully explained by Carnap in his article 
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” with the help of the concept of linguistic 
framework. As analytic statements, logical principles describe a linguistic 
framework. They are constitutive for a certain framework by providing the 
grammar and the rules for operating in that framework. In this sense they are 
necessary precisely because they are constitutive for the framework. Once you 
disobey them, you simply refuse to work within that framework. It is analogous 
with playing a game. If you do not accept the rules of a game, then you do not 
play that game. For that game, for that linguistic framework, the rules are 
constitutive, and thus necessary – from this internal perspective. The framework, 
of course, on pragmatic reasons, may be changed; its adoption is a contingent 
matter. This characterization of logical truths, as ‘framework principles,’ also 
reveals their regulative function. Since they indicate how one should work in a 
given framework, they are regulative for the activities performed in that 
framework.  
Although the regulative function of logical principles is usually recognized, 
the objection often raised is that in order to formulate a reasonable ideal, and not 
an arbitrary one, logical principles must have an objective ground, namely, a 
ground, or a corresponding structure in reality. We may admire, however, this 
lofty rationalist ideal to ground logical principles in the structure of reality, but we 
are by no means forced to infer the arbitrariness of logical principles from the fact 
that they do not have an identifiable correspondent in reality. Human 
communication and inquiry are directed to the achievement of certain purposes, 
and it is a matter of fact that the objectives of communication and inquiry are 
better achieved when the language is used in the manner prescribed by logical 
principles. An empirical study of the behaviour of men employed in 
communication and inquiry confirms this idea. Therefore, even though logical 
principles do not have a ground, or a subject matter, in reality, this does not imply 
that they are arbitrary. The general idea mentioned above is that the justification 
of logical principles is better understood in terms of objectives to be attained. 
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More specifically, a set of logical principles is justified, if it is adequate for 
attaining certain purposes in inquiry. In this sense, the selection of a set of logical 
principles, instead of another, has an objective basis.  
To sum up, logical principles are true statements in virtue of the meanings 
of the logical terms from a certain linguistic framework, in Carnap’s sense 
discussed in section IV.b. To understand them is sufficient for determining their 
truth value. These principles, as long as the relevant meanings are preserved, are 
necessary because to deny them merely means to misunderstand the expressions 
from their structure (see the answer to the second objection from the next 
section).  
VI. Final Remarks 
The main aim of this paper was to present and to briefly analyze the main 
interpretations of logical principles. I have first presented the central features of 
the ontological (or metaphysical) interpretation of logical principles (Tahko, Sher), 
which was found infeasible because, in my understanding, it assumes, without a 
reasonable ground, an a priori knowledge about certain facts, and also seems, at 
least in Tahko’s case, circular. Second, I have analyzed three main instantiations of 
the idea that logical principles are empirical hypotheses (Mill, Quine, Maddy), and 
I have tried to show why they seem problematic. Finally, I have sketched the 
main features of an interpretation which considers logical principles as non-
arbitrary statements, regulative for the use of language in inquiry, in the direction 
of clarity and precision. According to this interpretation logical principles are true 
statements based on the meanings of the logical terms from a certain linguistic 
framework. Logical principles are necessary relative to the preservation of those 
meanings. The pragmatic decision to change the linguistic framework may entail 
the adoption of another set of logical principles, but, of course, this does not mean 
that logical principles are refuted by facts (as we argued in section IV). I will end 
now by considering two objections for the interpretation proposed in this paper. 
An objection recently raised by Maddy63 to the idea that logical truths are 
true only in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms, and that their truth does 
not depend (also) on facts from the world/our experience, is that our use of 
language is not independent of the facts from the world we live in, which shape 
our use of language. This would entail that logical truths are also dependent of 
some relevant facts. Therefore, the question from the title of this paper – what 
                                                                
63 Maddy, “The Philosophy of Logic,” 490. 
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makes logical truths true? – would not get its entire answer by pointing out only 
to language, or meanings.  
I think that this objection could be dismissed. Of course, we may agree that 
natural language has an historical development and that the meanings of certain 
words may be suggested  by our experience from the world that we live in, but 
this is not relevant for answering the proposed question, i.e., what makes logical 
truth true?. For instance, we may either follow Einstein64 in saying that all our 
concepts and linguistic expressions – viewed logically – are free creations of our 
mind and could not be abstracted from experience, or we may agree that some 
concepts might be, somehow, suggested by experience, but this would not change 
the fact that the relevant factors for determining the truth of logical principles are 
only the meanings of the logical terms.65 The issue raised by Maddy is relevant, I 
think, only for the problem of the origin of meanings, but since is sufficient to 
fully understand the meanings of the logical terms in order to establish the truth 
value of a logical sentence, the semantic conception of logical truth remains 
untouched. 
Another objection often raised to the interpretation of logical principles as 
analytic statements, i.e., true in virtue of meanings, is that this view leaves 
unexplained the usefulness of logic in epistemic contexts, especially in the growth 
process of knowledge. I think that this is not the case. For instance, since the truth 
of logical principles is grounded in the meanings of the logical terms, we may ask 
ourselves: why these terms are introduced into language? As Hans Hahn66 
emphasized, a very plausible reason seems to be that we are not omniscient. 
Logical principles and logical deductions have significance for us precisely because 
we are not omniscient. If we were omniscient, then we probably would make only 
categorical assertions, without using logical terms as ‘not’ or ‘or.’ To use Hahn’s 
example, if I am asked about the colour of the dress worn by Miss Erna yesterday, 
and I am not able to remember its colour, I could say: it was red or blue, or it was 
not yellow, but if I were omniscient, I would simply say: it was red (involving in 
this way no logical term). 
Logical inference makes us aware of the propositions implicitly asserted 
when we assert other propositions – and it is in virtue of this fact that valid 
                                                                
64 Albert Einstein, “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge,” in The Philosophy of 
Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952). 
65 The knowledge of the syntactic structure is, of course, presupposed in this context. 
66Hans Hahn, “Logic, Mathematics, and Knowledge of Nature,” in Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. 
Ayer (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 157.  
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inferences have epistemic significance.67 For instance, if I assert that object A is 
either red or blue, and I also assert that object A is not red, then I implicitly have 
asserted that object A is blue. In this case, the conclusion is derived only in virtue 
of our rules which govern the use of the words ‘or’ and ‘not,’ and is not based on 
real connections among states of affairs, which we apprehend in thought. If 
someone refuses to recognize this valid logical deduction, he/she would not 
manifest a different belief about the behaviour of things, but he/she would merely 
refuse to speak about things according to the same rules as most of us do.68 As long 
as we maintain certain rules for the use of expressions, we preserve the meanings 
of logical terms, and, thus, logical principles cannot be false; any denial of them 
would be self-contradictory – at least as long as the classical meaning of negation 
remains invariant. This is precisely why logical principles are necessary in a 
certain linguistic framework.69 
 
 
                                                                
67 See Constantin C. Brîncuş, “The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-
Theoretic Approach,” in Meaning and Truth, ed. Sorin Costreie and Mircea Dumitru, 
(Bucharest: Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2015), 11-36.  
68 See also Hahn, “Logic, Mathematics, and Knowledge of Nature,” 156. 
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